ABSTRACT. This paper provides a complete characterization of epistemic models in which distributed knowledge complies with the principle of full communication [HOE 99, GER 99]. It also introduces an extended notion of bisimulation and corresponding model comparison games that match the expressive power of distributed knowledge operators.
Introduction
Distributed knowledge is a standard notion in epistemic logic [FAG 95, MEY 95] . Intuitively, a formula ϕ is distributed knowledge among a group of agents B iff ϕ follows from the knowledge of all individual agents in B put together. Semantically, ϕ is distributed knowledge among B iff ϕ is true in all worlds that every agent in B considers possible. This paper addresses two issues concerning distributed knowledge.
Full communication.
Van der Hoek, van Linder, and Meyer [HOE 99 ] argued that, to be of any use at all, a notion of group knowledge should comply with what they call the principle of full communication: whenever ϕ is considered group knowledge, it should be possible for the members of the group to establish ϕ through communication (this will be made more precise below). Van der Hoek, van Linder, and Meyer [HOE 99] and Gerbrandy [GER 99] showed that distributed knowledge does not generally comply with the principle of full communication, but does in certain special model classes. It is not clear, however, why distributed knowledge does not generally comply with the principle of full communication, and why it does in these special model classes. Moreover, it is not known whether these model classes are complete, that is, whether they comprise all models in which distributed knowledge complies with the principle of full communication. We will provide a simple analysis of the problem and a complete characterization of the class of models in which distributed knowledge complies with the principle of full communication.
Expressive power. A standard notion of structural equivalence between epistemic models is that of bisimilarity. This notion (to be defined below) perfectly matches the expressive power of basic epistemic formulas (formulas without distributed knowledge operators): if two models are bisimilar, then they satisfy exactly the same basic formulas. But adding distributed knowledge to the basic language yields a more expressive language, whose formulas may be able to distinguish bisimilar models. Is there a natural extended notion of bisimulation that matches the expressive power of the language with distributed knowledge? This question is the first of a list of open problems in a recent survey by van Benthem [BEN 05] . We will define and analyze a suitable extended notion of bisimulation, corresponding model comparison games, and a closely related extended notion of modal saturation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some basic notions from epistemic logic. Section 3 is concerned with the extent to which distributed knowledge complies with the principle of full communication, and section 4 introduces notions of bisimulation and saturation, as well as related model comparison games, to capture the expressive power of distributed knowledge operators. Sections 3 and 4 each conclude with a short summary and pointers to related work.
Epistemic Logic
The following notions are all standard in epistemic logic [FAG 95, MEY 95] . A countable set of proposition letters P and a finite set of agents A is assumed to be given throughout our general discussion and clear from the context in particular examples.
Languages. The basic epistemic language consists of all formulas that can be built from proposition letters in P using conjunction, negation, and a modal operator K a for every agent a ∈ A. K a ϕ stands for agent a knows that ϕ is true. The basic epistemic language is denoted by L K :
One standard way to extend the basic language is to add a modal operator D B for every group of agents B ⊆ A. D B ϕ stands for ϕ is distributed knowledge among B. The resulting language is denoted by L D :
-W is a non-empty set of worlds,
R assigns to every agent a ∈ A a so-called accessibility relation on W . Intuitively, (w, v) ∈ R(a) means that in world w, agent a considers world v possible. Accessibility relations are often assumed to be equivalence relations, or to have other less restrictive properties, but for sake of generality we do not commit ourselves to any such specific assumptions here. V associates every world w ∈ W with a subset of P, the proposition letters that are true in w. If M = (W, R, V ) is a model and w is a particular world in W , then (M, w) is called a pointed model, and w is called its actual world. We will often simply refer to pointed models as models. The information state [M, w] a of an agent a in (M, w) is the set of worlds that a considers possible in (M, w). Similarly, the information state [M, w] B of a group of agents B in (M, w) is the set of worlds that every agent a ∈ B considers possible in (M, w):
Semantics. The satisfaction relation between pointed models and formulas in L K or L D is recursively defined as follows:
Intuitively, the K a ϕ clause says that an agent knows ϕ to be true just in case ϕ is true in all worlds she considers possible. Similarly, the D B ϕ clause says that ϕ is distributed knowledge among B just in case ϕ is true in all worlds that every agent in B considers possible. A set of formulas Φ entails a formula ϕ, Φ ϕ, iff every pointed model that satisfies all formulas in Φ also satisfies ϕ. A set of formulas Φ is consistent or satisfiable iff there is a pointed model that satisfies all formulas in Φ. One set of formula Φ is consistent with another set of formulas Σ iff Φ ∪ Σ is consistent. A set of formulas Φ is satisfiable in an information state iff that information state contains a world that satisfies all formulas in Φ. The theory of a world in a model is the set of all formulas true in that world. A world is consistent with a set of formulas Φ iff its theory is consistent with Φ.
Full Communication
Van der Hoek, van Linder, and Meyer [HOE 99] argue that, to be of any use at all, a notion of group knowledge should comply with what they call the principle of full communication: whenever ϕ is considered group knowledge, it should be possible for the members of the group to establish ϕ through communication. To make this more precise, they define the knowledge set of a group of agents B in a model (M, w) to be the set of all L K -formulas that at least one agent in B knows to be true in (M, w):
Then they take it that a formula can be established through communication by a group of agents iff that formula is entailed by the knowledge set of that group. So distributed knowledge complies with the principle of full communication iff for all ϕ ∈ L K : It is not clear, however, why distributed knowledge does not generally comply with the principle of full communication, and why it does in models that are finite, (locally) distinguishing and/or full. Moreover, it is not clear whether all models in which distributed knowledge complies with the principle of full communication are finite, (locally) distinguishing and/or full. And if not, whether a complete characterization of such models can be given. Section 3.1 gives a simple analysis of why distributed knowledge does not always comply with the principle of full communication. This analysis yields a rather general class of models in which distributed knowledge does comply with the principle. Section 3.2 relates the defining properties of this class, called tightness and epistemic saturation, with notions familiar from modal logic. In particular, epistemic saturation is shown to be equivalent with modal saturation. In section 3.3 we compare our model class with the model class defined by van der Hoek, van Linder, and Meyer. We show that every finite, distinguishing model is tight and saturated, and moreover, that there is an interesting intermediate model class consisting of generated submodels of the canonical model. In section 3.4 we show that our model class can be generalized in various ways, which finally leads to a complete characterization of models in which distributed knowledge complies with the principle of full communication. Interestingly, the characteristic property of such models turns out to be a weak version of Gerbrandy's fullness property.
Distributed Knowledge and Full Communication
Why does distributed knowledge not comply with the principle of communication? One answer to this question is that in general an agent's information state may not contain every world that is consistent with her knowledge set. Consider, for example, the model depicted above: everything a knows in w is true in y. So y is consistent with a's knowledge set in w. Still, y does not belong to a's information state in w. Similarly, x does not belong to b's information state in w, even though everything b knows in w is true in x, that is, x is consistent with b's knowledge set in w. As a consequence, the intersection of two information states may sometimes yield more information than the union of the corresponding knowledge sets. To continue the above example, a and b's knowledge sets in w are identical. Thus, taking their union does not yield any new information. However, a and b's information states in w are different, and their intersection yields a new, more informative state. As a result, p is distributed knowledge among a and b in w, even though it is not entailed by the union of their knowledge sets. This explanation, trivial as it may seem, leads us to the characterization of a rather general class of models in which distributed knowledge does comply with the principle of full communication, namely, the class of models in which every agent's information state does contain every world that is consistent with her knowledge set.
This requirement can be split into two sub-requirements. First, every set of formulas that is consistent with an agent's knowledge set must be satisfiable in the agent's information state. We call this requirement epistemic saturation.
Second, every world that is consistent with an agent's knowledge set must be contained in the agent's information state. We call this requirement tightness.
DEFINITION 2 (TIGHTNESS
Notice that epistemic saturation and tightness are complementary requirements: the former requires that a model contains enough worlds; the latter requires that a model provides for enough access.
We now show that distributed knowledge complies with the principle of full communication in tight and epistemically saturated models. PROOF. -Let M = (W, R, V ) be tight and epistemically saturated. To prove: 
Tightness and Saturation
Tightness is familiar from modal logic (see, for example, [FIN 75]). Epistemic saturation seems new, but turns out to be equivalent with another very familiar notion from modal logic, namely, modal saturation (see, for example, [BLA 01]). A model M = (W, R, V ) is modally saturated iff for every w ∈ W , every a ∈ A, and every set of
PROPOSITION 4. -A model is epistemically saturated iff it is modally saturated.
PROOF. -Let M = (W, R, V ) be a model, a ∈ A, and w ∈ W .
It follows, by compactness, that Σ is satisfiable and therefore consistent. Then, by epistemic saturation of M , Σ must be satisfiable in [M, w] a . This means that Σ is satisfiable in [M, w] a , and thus that M is modally saturated.
(⇐) Suppose M is modally saturated. Let Σ be a set of L K -formulas that is consistent with KS a (M, w). Then every finite subset of Σ is satisfiable in [M, w] a . To see this, let Σ be a finite subset of Σ and suppose that Σ is not satisfiable in [M, w] a . Then ¬ Σ ∈ KS a (M, w), which contradicts the assumption that Σ is consistent with KS a (M, w). So every finite subset of Σ is satisfiable in [M, w] a . By modal saturation, it follows that Σ is satisfiable in [M, w] a , and thus that M is epistemically saturated. ! Henceforth, we will simply refer to modal and epistemic saturation as saturation.
Tight & Saturated versus Finite & Distinguishing
Next, we show how tightness and saturation are related to the special model properties defined by van der Hoek, van Linder, and Meyer. We prove that every finite, distinguishing model is tight and saturated, and also identify an interesting intermediate class of models.
PROPOSITION 5. -Finite, distinguishing models are saturated and tight.
PROOF. -Finite models are always saturated [BLA 01]. Now suppose a model M is finite and therefore saturated, but not tight. Then for some agent a there must be two worlds w and v in M such that everything a knows in w is true in v, but v is not contained in [M, w] a . Let Γ be the set of formulas true in v. Clearly, Γ is consistent with KS a (M, w). M is saturated so there must be a world u in [M, w] a that satisfies all formulas in Γ. But this means that u and v satisfy exactly the same formulas. So M is not distinguishing. We conclude that, if M is finite and distinguishing, then it must be saturated and tight. !
The class of saturated and distinguishing models clearly subsumes the class of finite and distinguishing models, but is itself subsumed by the class of tight and saturated models. Interestingly, a model is saturated and distinguishing if and only if it is a generated submodel of the so-called canonical model. To show this, let us first recall the relevant definitions, which are all standard in modal logic [BLA 01].
A set of L K -formulas Σ is maximally consistent iff it is consistent and for all ϕ ∈ L K , either ϕ ∈ Σ or ¬ϕ ∈ Σ. Note that the theory of a pointed model is always maximally consistent. The canonical model M c is a triple (W c , R c , V c ) where:
Given a model M = (W, R, V ) and a set of worlds X ⊆ W , the model M |X = (X, R|X, V |X) is called the restriction of M to X. M |X is a generated submodel of M iff, whenever w ∈ X and v ∈ [M, w] a for some a ∈ A, then also v ∈ X. So a generated submodel is a submodel that preserves information states.
Finally, two models (M, w) and (M , w ) are isomorphic, M, w ∼ = M , w , iff there is a bijective bisimulation (i.e., an isomorphism) Z between M and M such that wZw .
PROPOSITION 6. -A model is saturated and distinguishing iff it is isomorphic to a generated submodel of the canonical model.
(⇒) Suppose M is saturated and distinguishing. Then, every world in M has a unique, maximally consistent theory, and therefore uniquely corresponds to a world in M c . Let W be the set of all worlds w in M c that correspond to a world w in M , and let M = (W , R , V ) be the restriction of M c to W . We show (1) that M is a generated submodel of M c and (2) that M and M are isomorphic.
For (1), suppose that w ∈ W and (w , v ) ∈ R c (a) for some a ∈ A and some v ∈ W c . We must show that v ∈ W . By definition of the canonical model v satisfies every formula in KS a (M c , w For (2), let Z be the bijection that relates every world w ∈ W with its corresponding world w ∈ W . Clearly, w and w satisfy the same proposition letters. It remains to check the back and forth clauses. We do the forth clause; the back clause is completely analogous. Let a ∈ A and v ∈ [M, w] a . Clearly, Γ(M, v) is consistent with KS a (M, w), and therefore Γ(M , v ) is also consistent with KS a (M, w). But then, by definition of the canonical model, v ∈ [M , w ] a , as desired. 
A Complete Characterization of Full Communication
So far, we have established that finite, distinguishing models are canonical, that canonical models are saturated and tight, and that saturation and tightness are sufficient conditions for compliance with the principle of full communication. Now we could ask whether they are also necessary, that is, whether all models in which distributed knowledge complies with the principle of full communication are saturated and tight. The answer is no. To see this, reconsider the proof of proposition 3. The role of saturation here is to ensure that every L K -formula ϕ that is consistent with the knowledge set of a group of agents is satisfiable in the information state of every agent in the group. Saturation is sufficient here, but not necessary: it is concerned with sets of formulas, where it could equally well just be concerned with single formulas. Then, once it has been established that ϕ is satisfiable in the information state of every agent in the group, the role of tightness is to ensure that there is at least one world satisfying ϕ which is contained in the information state of all agents in the group. Again, tightness is sufficient to fulfil this role, but not necessary. These observations give rise to the following definition: 
Conclusion
Van der Hoek, van Linder, and Meyer [HOE 99] as well as Gerbrandy [GER 99] observed that distributed knowledge does not always comply with the principle of full communication. They also observed that distributed knowledge does comply with the principle in finite, distinguishing models, in locally distinguishing models, and in full models. It was not clear, however, why these properties were sufficient and whether they were necessary for compliance with the principle of full communication.
We established the following hierarchy of models in which distributed knowledge complies with the principle of full communication. Every class in the hierarchy contains the ones below it. full communication models saturated and tight saturated and distinguishing finite and distinguishing Our point of departure was the class of saturated and tight models, in which every agent's information state contains all worlds that are consistent with her knowledge set. We established that this class contains all finite and distinguishing models and all canonical (saturated and distinguishing) models. On the other hand, it is subsumed by the class of full communication models, which was shown to consist of all models in which distributed knowledge complies with the principle of full communication. Interestingly, the characteristic property of full communication models turned out to be a weak version of Gerbrandy's fullness property. One more thing to notice about the hierarchy above is that less restrictive properties are concerned with more fine-grained structural aspects of a model. Finiteness and distinguishability are concerned with the structure of a model as a whole, saturation and tightness are concerned with information states of individual agents, and full communication models impose restrictions on the information states of groups of agents. Distributed knowledge itself is defined in terms of information states of groups of agents. In the light of this observation it is not so surprising that finiteness, distinguishability, tightness, and saturation only led to a partial characterization of the class of full communication models. We leave such explorations for another occasion, however, and now turn to the second topic of the paper.
Expressive Power
Bisimulation, which was introduced in a general modal setting by van Benthem [BEN 76], is a standard measure of structural equivalence between epistemic models. Intuitively, two pointed models are bisimilar iff (1) they assign the same truth values to all proposition letters and (2) they assign equivalent information states to all agents. 
Collective Bisimulation
Bisimilarity requires two models to associate equivalent information states with every single agent. But distributed knowledge involves information states of groups of agents. Thus, in order to obtain a suitable notion of bisimulation, it seems natural to require two models to associate equivalent information states not just with every individual agent, but with every group of agents. Collective bisimilarity generalizes ordinary bisimilarity. The latter only requires the back and forth conditions to hold for singleton groups of agents. So if two models are collectively bisimilar, then they are also bisimilar, but not vice versa: the models depicted in figure 1 and 2 , for example, are bisimilar, but not collectively bisimilar.
We now show that collective bisimulation indeed matches the expressive power of L D and establish some of its basic properties. PROOF. -Take the union of all collective bisimulations between M and M . By proposition 14, this is again a collective bisimulation between M and M and clearly, it includes all others. !
Model Comparison Games
If two models are bisimilar, then they satisfy exactly the same formulas in L K . The opposite is only true for certain special classes of models. If two finite models, for example, satisfy the same formulas in L K , then they are bisimilar. However, infinite models may very well satisfy exactly the same formulas in L K even though they are not bisimilar. Intuitively, this is because whether or not a model (M, w) satisfies a formula ϕ only depends on worlds in M that can be reached from w in a finite number of steps along the accessibility relations in M . This number of relevant steps is bounded by the so-called modal depth of ϕ.
DEFINITION 16 (MODAL DEPTH). -The modal depth d(ϕ) of a formula ϕ ∈ L K is defined recursively as follows:
for all a ∈ A Now, for two models (M, w) and (M , w ) to satisfy the same formulas in L K it is sufficient that (M, w) and (M , w ) satisfy the same proposition letters and that for every finite path starting from w in M , we can find a corresponding path starting from w in M (and vice versa). Bisimulation requires something stronger, namely that (M, w) and (M , w ) satisfy the same proposition letters and that for every (possibly infinite) path starting from w in M , we can find a corresponding path starting from w in M (and vice versa). This is why two infinite models that satisfy the same formulas in L K are not necessarily bisimilar.
Model comparison games can be seen as finite approximations of a bisimulation. A model comparison game is played on two models, say (M, w) and (M , w ), by two players called spoiler and duplicator, and consists of a fixed number of rounds. Spoiler tries to establish that (M, w) and (M , w ) satisfy different formulas; duplicator tries to show that they satisfy exactly the same formulas. The number of rounds of the game yields a bound on the length of the paths starting from w in M and from w in M that are available to spoiler as possible evidence for a structural difference between M and M . If spoiler cannot win the n-round model comparison game on (M, w) and (M , w ), then these models satisfy exactly the same formulas in L K up to depth n. So if duplicator has a winning strategy for all model comparison games on (M, w) and (M , w ), then (M, w) and (M , w ) satisfy the same L K -formulas of arbitrary depth. And now the converse also holds: if (M, w) and (M , w ) satisfy the same L Kformulas, then duplicator has a winning strategy for all model comparison games on (M, w) and (M , w ). This works out because games themselves have a finite number of rounds (just like formulas have finite modal depth), but for every n, there is a game with n rounds (just as for every n, there are formulas with modal depth n). 
and (M , w ) satisfy exactly the same formulas in L D with depth n. Observe that, as P and A are both assumed to be finite, for every n ≥ 0, there are only finitely many formulas with depth n, up to logical equivalence. Now we prove, by induction on n, that duplicator has a winning strategy for the n-
The base case (n = 0) follows directly from the definitions.
The induction step involves two directions, which we treat separately: 
We observed that there are only finitely many formulas with depth n, up to logical equivalence. So ψ w corresponds to a finite disjunction, again of depth n. We have M, w D B ψ w , but M , w D B ψ w , even though d(D B ψ w ) = n + 1. This contradicts our assumption that (M, w) ≡ n+1 (M , w ). So we may conclude that duplicator has a winning strategy for the (n + 1)-round L D -game on (M, w) and (M , w ). !
Saturation and Fullness
Recall the notions of saturation and fullness from section 3. A model is saturated iff every set of L K -formulas that is consistent with the knowledge set of a single agent is satisfiable in the information state of that single agent. A model is full iff every set of L D -formulas that is consistent with the knowledge set of a group of agents is satisfiable in the information state of that group of agents. Notice that fullness generalizes saturation just like collective bisimulation generalizes ordinary bisimulation and distributed knowledge operators generalize individual knowledge operators: where saturation, bisimulation, and individual knowledge operators are concerned with the information states of individual agents, fullness, collective bisimulation and distributed knowledge operators are concerned with the information states of groups of agents.
There is an important and well-known connection between saturation, bisimilarity, and the expressive power of L K : saturated models are bisimilar iff they satisfy the same L K -formulas [ PROOF. -Proposition 12 already established that, in general, collectively bisimilar models satisfy the same formulas in L D . Here, we show that full models which satisfy the same formulas in L D are collectively bisimilar. Let M and M be full, and let w in M and w in M be such that (M, w) and (M , w ) satisfy the same formulas in L D . Let Z be the relation between W and W that consists of all pairs of worlds that satisfy exactly the same formulas in L D . Clearly, wZw . We will show that Z is a collective bisimulation between M and M . To do so, let B be an arbitrary group of agents and let v be any world in [M, w] B . Let Γ be the set of L D -formulas true in v. Then Γ is consistent with KS B (M, w), and therefore also consistent with KS B (M , w ). As M is full, Γ must be satisfiable in PROOF. -Clearly, collectively bisimilar models are always bisimilar. We must show that full, bisimilar models are always collectively bisimilar. To do so, let M and M be full and let w in M and w in M be such that (M, w) and (M , w ) are bisimilar. Let Z be the maximal bisimulation between (M, w) and (M , w ) (the existence of which is established in [BLA 01]). We will show that Z is also a collective bisimulation between (M, w) and (M , w ). To do so, let B be an arbitrary group of agents and let v be any world in PROOF. -Clearly, it is enough to prove the only if part. Let (M, w) and (M , w ) be full. Suppose (M, w) and (M , w ) satisfy the same formulas in L K . Since both models are saturated, they must be bisimilar [BLA 01]. Then, by proposition 20, they must be collectively bisimilar. But then it follows from proposition 12 that they must satisfy exactly the same formulas in L D . !
Conclusion
We have proposed an extended notion of bisimulation that matches the expressive power of the basic epistemic language extended with distributed knowledge operators. We have also defined related model comparison games and established their adequacy. Finally, we showed that fullness generalizes saturation just as collective bisimulation generalizes ordinary bisimulation and established that full models are collectively bisimilar iff they are bisimilar iff they satisfy exactly the same L K -formulas iff they satisfy exactly the same L D -formulas. In particular, L D and L K have equal expressive power with respect to full models. 
